

Følgeskriv

Øvelsens navn	SkagEx11
Tidspunkt for øvelse	7. - 8. september 2011
Tittel på rapport	SkagEx11 Evaluation Report
Øvelseseier	Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap
Kildehenvisning	Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap

Bakgrunnsinformasjon:

Øvelsestype: Full-scale.

Beskrivelse av øvelsen: The exercise scenario was based on the ferry MS Bohus on route between Strömstad and Sandefjord with a simulated list of 800 passengers on board. The ferry experienced fire in the engine room causing it to lose steering and collide with the oil bunker vessel Oslo Tank. The subsequent operation required large scale Search and Rescue, handling of evacuees and casualties as well as protection of the environment from the acute oil spill, which also resulted from the ship's collision.

Øvelsesdeltagere: The list of participants is long, and includes among others the police, search and rescue services (SAR), fire and rescue services, health sector services, and environmental protection assets from Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. There was also participation from different government agencies, municipalities and ministries – though limited. Private companies and volunteer organisations were also involved.

Evalueringsmetodikk: The evaluation made use of the following methods to collect data:

1. Evaluation Syndicate members' own observation during the exercise.
2. The feedback collected from controllers and dedicated evaluators after the exercise via the use of the Thematic Questionnaires and Incident Sheet templates.
3. Summaries from Hot-Wash Ups held at different localities after the exercise.
4. Documentation from the Post Exercise Discussion (PXD) held the day after the exercise and the Hot-Wash Ups.
5. Feedback based on a Generic Questionnaire, (supplementing the Thematic Questionnaire) that was sent to representatives of each participating organisation.
6. Individual interviews conducted with exercise participants, controllers or dedicated evaluators after the exercise regarding issues that required further clarification.
7. An Evaluation Conference held with representatives from participating organisations providing feedback to the first dissemination draft of the Evaluation Report as well as written replies after the conference.

Øvingsmål: The most important objective of SkagEx11 was to help improve the emergency preparedness as well as crisis management mechanisms within and between the participating countries.

According to the Exercise Directive, the **main objectives** of SkagEx11 were:

- To exercise and improve the national, regional and local preparedness as well as coordination between several levels in an emergency situation involving human casualties and serious pollution as a result of a larger ship accident in open sea.
- To test coordination and relevance of EU Civil Protection Mechanism.
- To exercise the understanding of roles and responsibilities at various decision levels during and after a crisis as well as coordination and cooperation between several nations when it comes to SAR efforts and mechanisms for dealing with human casualties and acute pollution.

Oppsummering/hovedfunn:

The general impression from all the data gathered was that the SkagEx11 exercise has fulfilled its purpose. Both structurally and contextually the SkagEx11 exercise was considered to be adequate in general regarding information from the exercise management, scenario, injects, length, pace, etc. The exercise scenario was also in general considered to be realistic and well delivered.

Main findings of the evaluation, thematic conclusions and lessons identified

Regarding the combined maritime search and rescue (SAR) operation

The SAR mission

- SkagEx11 succeeded in testing and training the ability and capacity for deploying multiple SAR resources from public, private and voluntary rescue services in the Nordic region.
- Activation, organisational mobilisation, and subsequent coordination of actions and resources were generally conducted in a professional manner within the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre Southern Norway (JRCC-SN). Nonetheless, the overall operational management became a challenge at JRCC-SN. There were several reasons, of which some concern the performance of exercise participants while others relate to exercise-technical constraints. Pre-planned prioritisations for airlifting RITS teams onto the ferry Bohus vis-à-vis airlifting injured persons off Bohus, for example, proved an issue of contention in the first hours of the exercise.
- The simultaneous use of an On Scene Coordinator (OSC) and an Aircraft Coordinator (ACO) was effective, although some uncertainty arose regarding lines of command and communications between them vis-à-vis the SAR Mission Coordinator (SMC) at JRCC-SN. The evaluation is inconclusive about whether the location of the ACO on a surface vessel was ideal.
- Despite well-arranged status meetings, exchange of SITREPS, and other activities at JRCC-SN to manage the flow of information, a common situation picture was lacking and relevant information regarding the SAR mission was not always shared widely enough with external partners. Efforts to generate an accurate persons on board (POB-list) list failed due to various exercise-technical constraints; the sheer complexity of the mass evacuation trained; and variations in the quality and timeliness of information available by actors at sea and on land.

- The crews on the various airborne and seaborne search and rescue unit (SRUs) generally performed their tasks well, although evacuation of persons via helicopters proved to be slower than desired, and several surface vessels evidently gained too little training from the exercise. Evaluators also generally agree, that the number of SRUs present in the exercise arena within the SkagEx11 timeframe did not realistically reflect the number expected in a real-life situation.

The RITS response

- SkagEx11 succeeded in testing and training the ability and capacity for deploying multiple RITS teams from different services, cities and countries in the Nordic region.
- At the tactical level, the RITS response was with few exemptions effective. The RITS team cooperated well with SRU crews and the ship's fire chief and crew. The coordination of tactical activities within and between the different RITS teams varied, but was generally very effective.
- At the operational level on board Bohus, the RITS response would have benefitted from better organising principles, a more straightforward chain of command, and a more pronounced leadership from the bridge. The use of a coordinating RITS team leader could also have worked better. Coordination with medical personnel apparently also left much to be desired.
- Similarly, there was room for improvement as regards information management. Despite available means of communications, SITREPs from RITS teams to the bridge were insufficient. There was also lack of communication to the OSC, and hence to the SMC at JRCC-SN.
- Based on the experiences, evaluators emphasise a need to revise relevant Norwegian and Nordic documents regulating the management aspects of multinational RITS response at sea.

Regarding the handling of evacuees and casualties on land

- The participants stress that the agencies' crisis management organisations were quickly established, and that the cooperation between the crisis management teams across different agencies was good.
- Roles and responsibilities were clear internally in the various agencies.
- The exercise showed a lack of common situation picture and insufficient exchange of information, both horizontally and vertically, particularly between the police and medical services.
- There was a lack of a joint system for prioritisation, registration and identification of evacuees and casualties.
 - The forms used to register personal information were not suitable, and made it difficult to maintain an overview of the number of evacuees and casualties.
 - Disaster Involved Register (DIR) did not function satisfactorily.
- There was a lack of joint systems or registries of available resources.
- There were challenges with both CIM and Nødnett (emergency communication system): The capacity was not sufficient, and the emergency communications system was not a good communication platform neither between land and sea, nor between land and air.

- The liaison system between medical services, the police, the County Governors and the municipalities/fire brigades did not work satisfactorily in all instances.
- Having evacuee centres and next-of-kin centres in different locations was not practical.
- There is a need to update and/or develop routines and planning framework.
- The medical services underline that reception and treatment of injured persons at the reception area and ER (Emergency Room) provided very good training.

Regarding the handling of the oil spill

- SkagEx11 exercised all three command levels in the environmental rescue operation and the phases prior to and after the accident. The overall assessment is that the exercise objectives were achieved in a satisfactory manner.
- The offshore oil spill recovery was exemplary when it came to requesting and receiving international assistance. Five further sub-objectives were tested and the overall assessment is that the results are satisfactory/good enough:
 - Handling a cross-border environmental rescue operation
 - Establishing cooperation and communication
 - Staff and command
 - Documentation
- Synchronization and knowledge between nations at the strategic command level could improve as regards to the use of resources and operation safety.
- The ICS (Incident Command System) provided good preconditions for an environmental rescue operation connected to the complex accident. The staff and command at the environmental rescue operation worked well on strategic command level due to the routines established and the templates used. However, the plan of action only considered the sector's own responsibilities.
- Coordination of the different units worked well within the environmental rescue operation.
- Oil spills do not pay attention to any geographical borders, such as joint national parks. The agreements that regulate environmental rescue operation across different geographical borders do not adequately take this into account. The need for a revision or alternatively an addition was pointed out during the exercise, which would facilitate possible need for diplomatic clearance.
- The engaged offshore units should be divided nation-wise according to the Copenhagen Agreement. This was not the case in SkagEx11, where the nations' units were mixed in the sectors. The conclusion from the post-exercise evaluation is that the possibility for situation adapted sectors (i.e. function, geography, organisation or capacity together with nation) should be investigated.
- The Copenhagen Agreement is not sufficiently known outside of each country's sector responsible agency.
- The participating units had, individually, unique preconditions for staff work with associated functions. Nonetheless, some of them were not fully adequate.
- Consensus was the key word for the cooperation between the Norwegian Coast Guard and the Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA). Although this demonstrated good collaboration

it was unclear who would have the preferential right of interpretation of the orders from the Recue Commander.

- Communication lines for the management needs were not ensured, neither horizontally nor vertically in the operational organisation.
- Finally, the overall assessment is that the exercising personnel were professional and competent.

Regarding the coordination with the EU

- SkagEx11 provided good opportunities to test some aspects of coordination with the EU. However, a portion of the settings were unrealistic and the exercise-technical means to test the role of the EU Civil Protection Team (EUCP Team) was not adequate. For instance, strategic cooperation or coordination was not exercised during SkagEx11.
- SkagEx11 demonstrated the need for a more coherent preparedness framework within the Mechanism. The EU Civil Protection (EUCP) Team experts need to undergo adequate education and drill based training and exercises before taking part in full-scale and complex exercises such as SkagEx11. They should have undergone higher level of courses within the Mechanism training framework to ensure that they are properly skilled to perform their duty. Besides individual adequacy, apt team training and building exercises should also be conducted prior to participating in exercises such as SkagEx11. The exercise should not test the specific individuals' abilities during a large scale exercise but rather test the system and the Mechanism itself.
- Since the EUCP Teams can be deployed anywhere within or outside of the EU, the team members' must be fluent in at least English.
- Future EU co-funded exercises should either ensure the proper inclusion of the EUCP Team by adjusting the overall scenario or by focussing on the EUCP Team in particular. It may however be useful to look further into the matter if the presence of EUCP Teams in large-scale exercises should continue to be obligatory or not.
- Large scale and multi-disciplinary or multi-sector EU co-funded exercises should, when enlisting EUCP Team members, ensure proper use of the opportunity. EUCP Team experts recruited in SkagEx11 were not fully able to test the EUCP Teams role within EU. Hence, the evaluation instead focuses on the assessment of the individuals' and team's particular proficiency. Since the numbers of large-scale EU exercises co-funded by the EU Financial Instrument of the Mechanism is low each year, it would be advisable to use this opportunity to test or develop the Mechanism as a system rather than an opportunity to provide individual EUCP Team experts the opportunity to strengthen their abilities.
- Participating States to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism should increase the knowledge and know-how regarding the role and responsibilities of the Mechanism to key function units within their national crises management system. This is especially relevant for functions at national and in some cases regional level.
- Providing the EUCP Team with a dedicated and knowledgeable liaison officer from the Local Emergency Management Authority is highly resource efficient and thus recommended.
- The EU Civil Protection Mechanism guidelines for Host Nation Support (HNS) have very recently been published and the Norwegian Host Nation Support guidelines are currently

being drafted and have not yet been finalised. Hence it would not be of much value to assess this aspect of the exercise. Occasions such as the SkagEx11 exercise is an excellent opportunity to, in the future, test and develop these guidelines when completed.

Gjennomgått av	Dato
Maja Stien	08. juli 2014