



Norwegian
Directorate for
Civil Protection

Barents Rescue 2013 Evaluation







Evaluation Report

Exercise Barents Rescue 2013



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
Preface

The document you are holding in your hands is the evaluation report of exercise Barents Rescue 2013 and the lessons identified during this exercise. The risk of a large, destructive rockslide in Troms formed the scenario backdrop as the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection hosted the exercise in September 2013. Rescue teams from Sweden, Finland, Russia and Norway worked alongside each other in response to the challenges that this exercise presented.

The scenario is based on a real life threat that exists in the Lyngen area (east of Tromsø). At Nordnes in Lyngen, a rock mass of 22 million cubic meters is moving at a rate of 4 – 5 cm a year. The situation is being closely monitored in order to be able to predict the rockslide, and have sufficient time to evacuate the population in the area. The rockslide, when it occurs, will result in a tsunami estimated to cause massive damage to infrastructure and surrounding communities.

The scenario includes a number of different challenges, ranging from the evacuation of communities, relocating the sick and elderly, and providing relevant and timely information to the public, to dealing with consequences after the rockslide has occurred. The estimated damages following a disaster of this magnitude include loss of all essential infrastructure like roads, electric power and electronic communication. There is also the potential for maritime and / or tunnel accidents, or groups of people being stranded without sufficient food, water and heating.

The Barents region is characterized by long distances and limited resources. We must continuously strive to have sufficient preparedness and capability to deal with major disasters in this region. When disaster strikes, the closest resources could well be located in a neighboring country. It is therefore essential that we train and conduct joint exercises to benefit from the sharing of information and lessons learned in relation to preventing and responding to emergencies and limiting their consequences. Barents Rescue 2013 was intended to exercise the civil protection resources in the whole region, in order to achieve the best possible preparedness, and be able to deal with a “worst case” scenario in this region.



Jon Lea
Director General of DSB

Summary

A main challenge in the Barents Region is that the communities are relatively small with long distances between them, limited availability of rescue resources, and limited experience with handling large and complex incidents. Findings from observations and the participants' own evaluations show there is a need for training to be better prepared. The need for training is even stronger when the players have to interact with foreign resources.

Because the Norwegian rescue and emergency sector in northern Norway has no common communication network, performance is affected to some extent. In a few years, *Nødnett*, the Norwegian Emergency Public Safety Network, will alleviate this problem. *Nødnett* is a separate radio network built according to the TETRA standard specifically for rescue and emergency users.

There is certainly a potential for better coordination between both local and regional agencies and organisations. This is an issue not only in northern Norway, but applies to most of the country. Some agencies have established procedures to meet and interact - the County governor's emergency council might be a good example.

Norway needs to further develop its understanding of what it means to receive foreign personnel. This is important to both the exercise management and the local level emergency management. The need to further develop the Host Nation Support function in all phases of an operation is important. As a part of this, there is also a need for better knowledge of the other Barents countries' recourses and operational procedures. It seems that Norway could have made better use of the Barents Agreement and Barents Joint Manual. Many of the same lessons learned here also applied during Barents Rescue 2011, which took place in Sweden.

The national plans for large rockslides need further development – both when it comes to coordinating local/regional plans with national plans, and to establishing a common understanding of the plans. This also might apply to other areas where regional and national coordination is needed.

The exercise tested national and international warning and alarm routines provided in relevant agreements. Players in the exercise increased their awareness regarding the use of media as an important part of crisis management, as well as the significance of communication with the population before and during a crisis.

Through the planning process and implementation of the exercise, participants have established good personal networks, and participants and countries have improved their familiarity with and knowledge of plans and resource use. However, there is room for improvement when it comes to more clearly indicating and determining, in advance, the form

and content of the planning conferences, and to what degree the syndicates will be working independently during the conferences.

The exercise promoted cooperation between various authorities in the Barents Region, in addition to authorities at national and international levels. The exercise showed that many resources are available, and involvement and efforts are strong, but it can be immediately concluded that there are still major challenges within the exchange of information and coordination. There is still a way to go when it comes to horizontal and vertical communication at strategic, operative and tactical levels.

1 Introduction

Barents Rescue 2013 was carried out on 17-19 September in Troms in Norway. The exercise scenario was the real possibility of a rockslide in Lyngen municipality. Rescue teams from Sweden, Finland, Russia and Norway participated in the exercise, which included three main scenarios:

- evacuation of residents in Lyngen municipality
- tunnel accidents (fire and landslide)
- accident in international youth camp

Barents Rescue 2013 involved approx. 70 agencies and organisations. The exercise tested various aspects from the Barents Agreement regarding notification and procedures for inquiring, sending and receiving resources across national borders, as well as the extensive field exercises in the form of evacuation and rescue efforts. The DSB (Directorate for Civil Planning and Emergency Planning) had 30 evaluators at various locations during the exercise. The agencies and organisations that participated in the exercise also evaluated themselves and sent their reports to the DSB.

1.1 Framework

Since 2001, the Barents Rescue exercises have been carried out in accordance with the Barents cooperation. The first exercise was carried out within the framework of Partnership for Peace, but in the time since Norway last organised the exercise in 2005, the framework has been the Barents cooperation. The exercises focus on strengthening and maintaining the ability to achieve joint assistance in the event of a major crisis in the Barents Region. Former host nations have been Sweden in 2001, Norway in 2005, Finland in 2007, Russia in 2009 and Sweden in 2011.

The area is large, distances are long and resources are limited. The importance of cooperation and exchange of resources can be large and important.

The Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB) was assigned the task of planning and execute the Barents Rescue 2013 exercise by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security.

1.2 Scenario

The scenario that formed the basis for the planning process of the Barents Rescue 2013 exercise was a massive rockslide into a fjord, and an ensuing tsunami. The scenario is based on a real life threat that exists in the Lyngen area (east of Tromsø). At Nordnes in Lyngen, a rock mass of 22 million cubic metres is moving at a rate of 4 – 5 cm a year. The situation is

being closely monitored in order to be able to predict the rock-slide, and have sufficient time to evacuate the surrounding communities. When it occurs, the rockslide will result in a tsunami that will cause a wash-up with an estimated height of 45 metres above sea level. Excessive amounts of rain in northern Norway in 2012 and throughout the summer of 2013 have resulted in increased movement of the land mass during spring and autumn, and an “Orange Alert” has been in effect since October 2012.

The scenario includes a number of different challenges, ranging from the evacuation of communities, relocating the sick and elderly, and providing relevant and timely information to the public, to dealing with consequences after the landslide has occurred. The estimated damages following a landslide of this magnitude include loss of all essential infrastructure like roads, electric power and electronic communication. There is also the potential for maritime and/or tunnel accidents, or groups of people being stranded without sufficient food, water and heating. The exercise began with a notification when Nordnes went from orange to red phase. A larger evacuation of residents in Lyngen municipality was initiated.

1.3 Objectives

The purpose of the full-scale exercise Barents Rescue 2013 was to improve communication, cooperation and coordination between countries that may become involved in an emergency in the Barents Region. The exercise is intended to improve preparedness and co-operational effectiveness of civil protection and joint emergency response as well as developing the responders’ network.

- Define, test and evaluate relevant bilateral and multilateral agreements for assistance and the applicable legal and administrative framework.
- Promote cooperation between authorities in the Barents Region as well as at the national and international level.
- Test national and international warning and alarm routines as stated or indicated in relevant agreements.
- Improve procedures and practical activities for requesting, sending and receiving assets.
- Strengthen trans-boundary cooperation at local and regional level.
- Enhance awareness and use of media being an important part in the crisis management process for channelling information to the public.
- The planning process itself as an important element in building personal networks, enhancing familiarisation between participating agencies and countries and for improving the planning process.

2 Evaluation method

Referring to Article 2 in the “Agreement between the governments in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region on cooperation within the field of emergency prevention, preparedness and response” the Contracting Partners shall “further develop such actions and methods, which increase the efficiency of international cooperation in emergency prevention, preparedness and response”.

In order to improve mutual understanding, share experiences and institutionalise the lessons learned during the planning process and exercise, it is essential to conduct a thorough evaluation. The evaluation process culminates in this report where conclusions and recommendations for further development are put forward.

A dedicated Evaluation Syndicate, led by the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB), has carried out the evaluation. The evaluation organisation includes members from each of the participating countries: Sweden, Finland, Russia, and Norway. The syndicate was formed at the beginning of the exercise planning process, and has been involved in the planning process and the preparations for the exercise, as well as during the exercise itself.

2.1 Data collection

Data collection has been carried out by the following means:

- Observations during the exercise: approximately 30 evaluators with specific tasks.
- Generic Questionnaire regarding participating agencies’ and organisations’ experiences and assessments pertaining to the exercise.
- Electronic questionnaire regarding the planning process.
- Feedback from the participants in the Post Exercise Discussions (PXD) in Levi, Finland.

Observations during the exercise

Evaluators instructed by the Evaluation Syndicate were positioned at every site throughout the exercise arena, corresponding to the focus areas of the evaluation. The aim was to closely monitor the decision-making processes, action patterns and coordination, as well as other relevant factors.

In addition, some of the controllers took part in the evaluation with observations they made during their primary tasks as Distaff appointed controllers.

The members of the Evaluation syndicate documented their own observations during the exercise. The Evaluation Syndicate were both on scene and located in different organisations (the police, the County Governor etc.) Moreover, copies of information exchanges between the key participants during the exercise (sent c.c. Distaff) were made available to the Evaluation Syndicate.



On-scene evaluators at work – photo: DSB

All the dedicated evaluators have submitted written reports. From these reports, the evaluation syndicate has gained much valuable information, particularly in regard to the different aspects of the field training exercise. This information serves as an addition to the written feedback from participating organisations and agencies.

Generic Questionnaire

A generic questionnaire was sent to more than 60 participating agencies and organisations. The questionnaire contains about 30 questions, and each organisation is encouraged to answer all the questions regardless of which exercise elements they took part in. By doing so, the organisations will sum up their own experiences and assessments pertaining to the following topics:

- The purpose of Barents Rescue
- Existing plans and agreements
- Crisis management organisation
- Information management
- Crisis communication
- Coordination of actions and resources
- Field response operations

We have limited information in some areas. This applies to operative management and cooperation between different countries' response teams. There could be several reasons for this, related to queries and the data collection in general. The evaluation is subject to the available documentation. All together there are good reasons for considering the method approach and the procedures best suited for each exercise.

With a response rate of approximately 50 per cent the evaluation syndicate believed it was important to make sure to validate the conclusions reached from analysis of this material. Still we think most of the essential participants have answered the questionnaire. This was done through comparisons with observations from the evaluator reports and through feedback from the Post Exercise Discussion in Finland.

Electronic Questionnaire about the planning process

With regard to evaluation of the planning process, an electronic questionnaire was sent out to organisations and agencies who took part in the planning of Barents Rescue 2013. The response rate was approximately 60 per cent. From this data material (included PXD) DSB has conducted an analysis with recommendations for improvements of the organisation and conduction of the Barents Rescue planning process (cf. chapter 3).

Post Exercise Discussion (PXD)


Representatives from the participating organisations, the Core Planning Group and relevant experts were invited to participate in the Post Exercise Discussions conference in Finland in December 2013. The purpose was to provide an opportunity for the Evaluation Syndicate to receive feedback on the preliminary evaluation report as well as for participants to provide remarks prior to the finalisation of the report. The objective of the evaluation syndicate's programme in the PXD was to explore which exercise participants deem as providing the most important lessons. This was done through a combination of group discussions and plenary presentations. Information from group and plenary discussions as well as from presentations from the participating nations provided a foundation for comparison with the lessons already identified from analysis of existing data material. This exercise gave the evaluation syndicate confidence in the validity of its conclusions.

3 Planning process

One of the exercise goals for BR 13 was ensuring that the planning process would contribute to building networks and strengthening cooperation between participating authorities and countries (cf. Chapter 1). There was also a desire to gain experience to improve the actual planning process. The planning process refers to the Concept Development Conference (CDC) the Final Planning Conference and other work meetings until the start date of the exercise.

We have summarised experiences and lessons in connection with the planning process from observations along the way, an electronic questionnaire to participants in the syndicates, and through feedback from the Post Exercise Discussion (PXD). Comments in cursive are from the questionnaire.

In all, our impression is that the planning process functioned well. It provided a good opportunity to coordinate and clarify roles, responsibilities and tasks between the syndicates, and was well suited to establishing and developing networks.



Planning conference

Eighty-one per cent of respondents to the questionnaire fully or partially agreed that they benefitted from the planning conferences. Responses to both the questionnaire and PXD questioned whether the number of participants should be limited. With up to 75 organisations involved, the conferences became quite large. The primary participants had clear tasks and roles and a clear opinion of why they were participating, while others did not have such defined roles/tasks and were left wandering without a clear goal for their own

participation. *"The number of participants could have been limited to those that actually had a mandate and authority to plan on behalf of the agency they represented [...]."*

The form of the planning conferences should also be considered. For example, there should be a clearer distinction between conference and workshop. Some respondents recommend facilitating more group work (workshops) along the way.

A fixed item on the agenda should be that the host nation presents its own organisation of the rescue work. This can prepare the other countries on how to interact. Time should also be allocated for coordination, overview and planning the overarching topics.

It is beneficial for the syndicates and individual participants to prepare as much as possible before the planning conferences. Goals and the agenda for each conference must be clearly defined and the activities at the conferences must be correlated with this. *"More attention on why and what we are training for."*

The questionnaire shows that 9 out of 10 (90 per cent) partially or fully agreed that the planning process expanded their contact network. In the assessment of what participants enjoyed the most at the planning conferences, networking is at the top of most comments:

- *"The contact with new experts from the entire Nordic region".*
- *"Increased contact network with our neighbouring countries".*
- *"Expanding our network and understanding each area's responsibility".*

Planners' expertise

It is also noted as important that those participating in the planning process must have relevant expertise in relation to what they will be doing: *"Too little knowledge on exercise planning in the group. The majority had never done this before."*

The result from the questionnaire shows that the majority, to some or a large extent, had knowledge about exercise planning in advance, approx. half had some or a large degree of knowledge about the Barents Agreement and a scarce minority had some or a large degree of knowledge about the Barents Joint Manual.

Barents Agreement and Barents Joint Manual are the basis documents for this exercise, and it is important that they are known, used and referenced.

Work in the syndicate

Eight out of ten fully or partially agree that the work in the syndicates functioned well, but that there is room for improvement. About 7 out of 10 fully or partially agree that the responsibilities and roles in the syndicate were clear. In addition to the need for clarity with regard to role and responsibility distribution inside the syndicates, the distribution between each syndicate must also be clear. At the same time, it was noted that more internal work

should be carried out in the syndicates prior to the planning conferences, to get more time at the conferences for coordination, overview and handling of overarching issues.

In both the questionnaire and PXD it is noted that project management *“should follow up the various syndicate leaders and requirements should be set for the quality and formality of the work conducted”*.

Goals of field training exercise

The majority of respondents in the questionnaire fully or partially agreed that concrete field training exercise goals were provided from their own organisation/agency. In the PXD, it was emphasised that the goals should have been communicated somewhat earlier in the process.

The majority also agrees that the exercise objectives were sufficiently considered in the planning, but more coordination of goals and a stronger focus on goals and goal achievement in the planning are sought.

Sharing information

There is a clear need for an effective tool for sharing information. A tool called Fronter was used during BR 13. It is essential to have joint guidelines for using the tool and that everyone complies with this. In the PXD it was asked whether there should also be a field training exercise webpage.

Other elements for experience from the planning process

The exercise undoubtedly supports the Barents cooperation. A joint improvement plan should be established and then determine what added value the exercise could bring and how. The use of the Barents Agreement (and the Barents Joint Manual): as long as this is the valid/fundamental documents for these exercises they should be known, used and referred to.

It is important to decide upon to what extent the Barents Rescue Exercises also should emphasise exercise of the strategic levels. BR13 focused mainly on the field training.

Suggestions for improvement

- The idea of Barents exercises should be supporting the Barents Region as a whole. The exercises should be based on risk assessments. A joint improvement plan should be established and then determine the added value the exercise could bring and how.
- The form and content of the conferences should be clarified, and to what extent the syndicates will be working independently during the planning conferences.
- Guidelines should be established for preparing exercise goals – ensuring a more unified understanding of what an exercise goal entails. There should also be deadlines for when the exercise goals must be defined.
- Need for presentation of the host nations government’s organisation of rescue operations.

- More awareness about why and what we practice – focus on evaluation and experiences from former exercises.
- Many had little experience with the execution of exercises - the need for courses. Written material that easily explains the background for the agreement and exercise.
- Better systematic use of lessons identified from former Barents Rescue Exercises in the planning process.
- BR13 focused mainly on the field training. It is important to decide upon to what extent the Barents Rescue Exercises also should emphasise exercise of the strategic levels.

4 AlarmEx

The objective was to *Test national and international warning and alarm routines as stated or indicated in relevant agreements.*

This part of the exercise had the following sub-objectives and Focus Areas:

- Test alarm chain/alarm routines regionally, nationally and internationally
- Activate appropriate alert status
- Detect possible informal ways for sounding an alarm/notifying besides the “official” alarm routines, if any
- Use correct/established request and accept communication routines as well as designated POC:s

The main focuses of the alarm exercise was to test and activate the command and decision-making levels from the regional responsible authorities to the national Points of Contact (POC) and further to the international corresponding POC's. Particular emphasis was made on activating both the regional structures within the BEAC cooperation, as well as communication on capital-level between these states.

The ALARMEX had three parts;

- National warning exercise from green to yellow phase(29 August at 1100 hours)
 - National warning exercise between the geological survey centre and key actors in the region.
- Readiness escalation from yellow to orange phase(13 Sept at 1000 hours)
 - First international notification, early warning ref article 6 in the agreement
- Readiness escalation 3 orange to red phase (16 Sept at approx. 1300 hours)
 - Ref article 7 in the agreement, request for assistance
 - Updated situation picture, additional information regarding the needed assistance etc.

Following the ALARMEX a daily “lessons identified” session was held during the afternoon telephone conferences. This focused on key lessons that can be extracted from the exercise both in terms of relevance for handling future disasters and conduct of future exercises of this nature.

The Barents Rescue Agreement (dated 11 December 2008), Barents Joint Manual (dated May 2013) and EXSPEC (dated 1 August 2012) are the main reference documents.

Description

The following alarms were sent to JRCC about the situation:

- On 29 August: First alert from Troms Police District at 12.33 hours local time in accordance with plan. SITREP followed shortly after. The message was clear and understandable.
- On 13 September: First alert at 10.20 hours local time from Troms Police District in accordance with plan. SITREP followed shortly after. The message was clear and understandable.
- On 16 September: First alert at 11.30 hours local time from Troms Police District in accordance with plan. SITREP followed shortly after. The message was clear and understandable.

Contingency plans were then read and situation evaluated at the JRCC and in conference with the police in Troms. Notifications sent to designated contact points (POC), national and international, in accordance with plans and according to the Barents Joint Manual 3.2.1.

All received both early warning and request for assistance notifications. There were some minor practical problems, but this was quickly resolved. The point of contact in Moscow (Russia) was updated in the Barents Joint Manual just prior to the exercise, and JRCC sent the messages to both POCs in Russia.

Duty personnel in all the countries informed their chief officers/authorities about notification/request faxes when received.

In addition to fax messages, e-mails were also sent. JRCC received receipts from all the countries that the e-mails were received.

Analysis

The exercise confirms that communication between four countries (FIN, SWE, RUS, NOR) works. There were only small practical problems, which were resolved, but it shows the importance of having an updated manual at all times, and that messages are sent not only by fax. Each country also has some internal issues that have to be discussed on a national level. It is recommended that the POCs are the same agencies that are in contact on a regular basis.

It does not seem that there were any major language problems in connection with the AlarmEx. Still, all countries emphasise the importance of giving clear messages and that the duty personnel have adequate language skills.

The reports from the AlarmEx suggests that the Joint Committee once again should look into the Barents Joint Manual with special emphasis on chapter 3 *Operational information*. Special focus should be on how the national points of contact should be alerted; by fax, telephone or e-mail, and in what order. This exercise shows that e-mails work, and the addresses of the POCs are also stated in the Barents Joint Manual.

In the present version of the Barents Joint Manual only a “request for assistance” is to be accompanied by telephone contact afterwards. The reports suggest that this also should be done by “notification of emergencies”.

Suggestions for improvements

- Notification procedures in the Barents Joint Manual should also include telephone and e-mail.
- It is recommended that “notification of emergencies” should also be accompanied by telephone contact.
- Conducting a “small-scale” Alarm Exercise each year under the supervision of the Joint Committee, combined with a yearly revision of the Barents Joint Manual (see also section 4.2.2) could be recommended.

5 Field Training Exercise

In view of the many and very different organisations who participated in Barents Rescue 2013, the phrase "field response operations" is interpreted here as covering a wide spectrum of activities at or near the scene of the incident and elsewhere. In most circumstances, the activities either relate to deploying resources in the field or performing tactical/operational crisis management at a subordinate level of decision-making. As mentioned in chapter 2, the information in this part is mostly based on Norwegian feedback. Rescue personnel from Russia, Finland and Sweden were highly represented and did the complete Field Training Exercise.

5.1 DISTAFF

Description

Scenario/ DISTAFF was responsible for developing the scenario and sub-scenarios during the planning process, and for staffing and running DISTAFF during the exercise. The Scenario/DISTAFF syndicate was responsible for supervising the Detailed Scenario Episodes Catalogue (DSEC) process, as well as the detailed planning that was delegated to other exercise syndicates.

The FTX syndicate was responsible for the different sub-scenarios. The focus was on realistic injects to the DSEC, while ensuring a safe exercise venue.

Analysis

DISTAFF could have worked more as a joint effort. There were many different computer systems, information from many exercise web pages which was received piece by piece, but no clear overall view of what was going on.

Using national liaison teams worked out well since there were a lot of last minute adjustments/changes.

It is natural that the host country has the largest participating organizations, but it is important to include the other nations throughout the whole process to ensure that the exercise does not become too much a national exercise.

Suggestions for improvements:

- An important part of the planning process is to produce scenario injects for the DSEC. Based on expertise, participants from organizations and agencies in all countries were invited to contribute, but the contributions could be followed up to a greater extent.

- The use of international working standards such as OSOCC, INSARAG guidelines could be used in the Barents exercises in the future.
- A joint improvement plan should be established and then determine what added value the exercise could bring and how.

5.2 Evacuation

Description

A nursing home in the municipality of Lyngen was evacuated; and sick and old patients were moved to safe areas zones or to hospitals in Tromsø. Only Norwegian rescue services were used in the management of the evacuation scenario, and therefore there is no description and analysis of support from the other Barents countries.

Forty-five patients ranging in age from young to old were evacuated from the health centre in Lyngen; some had mental problems, others were medical patients, and others were nursing home patients in need of 24-hour care. Several patients were mobile while others remained in their hospital beds. Representatives from the police and emergency medical services with a trauma team from the hospital in Tromsø (UNN) were on site. There were also employees from the health centre, and the health and care services manager represented crisis management. The Red Cross came as a resource later in the evacuation. Many available resources were utilised, including a total of six ambulances for evacuating the most needy. The incident commander-police and operative health supervisor were also on site, but the technical health supervisor (doctor) was not present.

Two farms with livestock were also evacuated. The livestock were evacuated by the farmers themselves, with guidance from the Norwegian Food Safety Authority and the municipality.

Analysis

During the evacuation, it could have appeared as if there was limited communication between strategic management and response personnel although communication worked well between on-duty personnel. Coordination across municipalities and counties, including internally between agencies in the municipalities did not function optimally and there is potential for further improvement in this area.

5.3 Tunnel accidents

Description

The tunnel scenario was divided into two, one involved a car fire in the Pollen tunnel, the other was a landslide in the tunnel on the opposite side. At the southern part of the Pollfjell tunnel smoke/fire was reported in a car. It started with an engine failure in a car into which the next car crashed. Several cars followed and it became an extensive chain collision and fire. This evolved into massive smoke and several people came running out of the tunnel, while others perished. At the north part of the tunnel the entrance collapsed and several cars were buried. Emergency services were alerted by people who stood outside the tunnel.

The fire departments in Lyngen, Storfjord and Kåfjord all have part-time forces where the crews are called in the event of an alarm. They have aid agreements with each other, including when it comes to putting out fires.

Analysis

The local fire and rescue agencies are not sufficiently co-trained, which is largely caused by considerable geographical distances. This results in significant challenges when they need to interact and also head response efforts with other nations' forces at a scope they are not trained or educated for. When as many players as in the Barents Rescue are working together, it appears to be very challenging for local fire departments to coordinate all the response crews. Furthermore, there is uncertainty in connection with the extent of knowledge about the various professions that are involved. This makes it difficult for the incident commander to get an overview, and use the available resources. It could appear as if there is an unclear understanding of roles among the experts in such incidents. There was too little communication between the technical fire supervisor and the other nations' leaders at a tactical level.

The three fire departments' radio terminals are not programmed so they can interact efficiently. They also do not have a sufficient number of radio terminals and communications equipment, and do not have the capability to communicate with each other daily.

As the players do not have joint communication, a lot of information was communicated directly between leaders face-to-face. This resulted in a slow flow of communication and that the information changed from level to level. This was eventually partially solved by implementing liaison schemes, which functioned well.

Communication between the technical supervisors on the fire side was partially absent because there was no radio communication. However, in some cases there was good dialogue in ILKO (incident commander's command post) between leaders from different nations. However, it appeared as if there was sound communication between each nation's technical supervisors and the actors during all scenarios.

The interaction internally at ILKO was hampered due to lack of joint communication, which led to unnecessary delays. However, coordination between fire departments and other nations' resources and ILKO was good. The Russian fire and rescue personnel performed excellently at the incident site, establishing lighting, rigging an inflatable raft for searching and implementing a search at sea. However, there were some issues with communication with the Russians, but they performed an excellent operation in the tunnel, despite operating as smoke divers without accompanying fire extinguishing water. This illustrates the need to clarify which health, safety and the environment (HSE) requirements apply in advance.

There was also a lack of management of the response crews. A Norwegian technical fire supervisor was replaced with a rescue supervisor from Sweden. This was not communicated to the Norwegian crews that were responding, which led to confusion regarding who they should receive orders from. It was therefore unclear who was responsible for the safety of the Norwegian crews. It has subsequently been questioned whether it is possible to transfer command and control of Norwegian crews to a foreign supervisor during response efforts on Norwegian soil.

It took a disproportionately long period of time to evacuate the injured people from the area. Much of this time was spent on deficient communication between the various agencies at the site. Misunderstandings arose regarding what safety requirements were set for crews entering the area. For example, some health crews were held back from responding because deficient communication between incident commanders caused uncertainty regarding which crews could enter the site.

Interaction between crews in direct response efforts was considered successful by many. The willingness to use each other and assist each other was significant. This means that the communication between supervisors was deficient, and hindered optimal efficient response efforts.



Photo: DSB

5.4 Youth camp

Description

The youth camp scenario involved a major search and rescue operation with considerable resources. The police, health personnel and voluntary emergency crews participated from the Norwegian side, and rescue groups from Sweden and Finland, and Russian emergency crews with special expertise. In addition to the rescue operation locally at the incident site, regional hospitals and the municipal health service also participated in this part of the exercise. The exercise also involved training in evacuation of Nordic citizens home to their respective countries.

A huge international youth camp with 200 participants from the Barents Region and other countries was held in the Lyngen area. Because the theme of the camp was “Living the natural way”, all modern equipment such as mobile phones and other electronic devices were handed in before the youth entered the camp. Even though the Nordnes alert phase increased from orange to red, camp leaders chose to continue the camp. The area where the camp was located well above the flooding zone from the tsunami and they thought a landslide and a tsunami would be a memory for life. A list of participants was kept in the camp and lost in the incident.

The scenario was divided into three separate Search and Rescue (SAR) operation, alerted to RSC in sequence:

- A small group of people from the camp missing in the mountains,
- A small group of people missing on a cano-expedition to Årøya
- A large incident in the youth camp,.

Analysis

The two main objectives for this scenario was to exercise the cooperation and communication between the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC), Rescue Sub-Centre (RSC) and Regional Emergency Medical Communication Centre (R-EMCC) with the focus on efficient use of rescue resources, in addition to exercise the communication between Incident Commander (IC) – JRCC/RSC/R_EMCC in a SAR- operation, involving air, sea and land resources, included Aircraft Coordination (ACO).

The overall finding was that the communication and coordination between JRCC/E-RMCC and RSC did not work. JRCC has the overall responsibility for the rescue operation and has also the experience and means of communication with sea and air resources. To efficient and safely use these resources in a SAR-operation, there is a need for close and frequent communication between JRCC and RSC/R-EMCC. Initially, the communication worked and JRCC was notified about the two first scenarios, missing people in the mountains and missing people at Årøya, but during this exercise there was almost impossible for JRCC to contact RSC, and no SITREPs were given to the JRCC from RSC.

This is best exemplified with the experience of the ACO. The ACO function is well established in maritime and aeronautical SAR under guidelines from IMO (International Maritime Organization) and ICAO (International Civil Aeronautical Organization) and well familiar, used and exercised for the JRCC. The concept is not often used in land SAR. Therefore this is an unfamiliar term for the RSC. The ACO role is divided in two. They shall execute the SAR-plan given by the JRCC and ensure flight safety during the operation.

Considerable air resources were available: 5 helicopters, including a Swedish police helicopter and an P3C Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA).. The NOCGV Andenes was on Thursday morning at approx. 0800 hours assigned the role of ACO by JRCC. The ACO function was intended established operatively with use of agreed frequencies and methods for communication between KV Andenes, JRCC, onshore resources and helicopters/aircraft. The exercise also involved a handover of the ACO function from NOCGV Andenes to the P-3C MPA.

NOCGV was never able to achieve contact with IC and ACO therefore chose to make its own prioritisations and assigned incoming air units tasks to the best of its ability in cooperation with JRCC. This would not have been a problem if the communication between RSC and JRCC worked. This was not the case; JRCC was never informed about the situation in the youth camp. Initial, considerable resources were therefore used in the two smallest scenarios. Only

intervention from DISTAFF and controllers at JRCC ensured that JRCC was notified about the youth camp.

In reality, such a scenario will be very complex and the exercise does not provide a realistic picture of what the rescue service can offer during such an incident. The police's organisation showed that they are seemingly not sufficiently prepared for such major incidents, which will require additional resources and different organisation. Advanced KO (incident commander's command post) should have been established by the Civil Defence that was present at the accident site and offered their services, but the police did not request assistance. Police management was not clear enough, and the interaction with health did not function.

The technical fire director and cooperation with the other nations' response personnel and technical directors eventually started functioning well.

The most important thing in a catastrophe like the youth camp scenario is to get the wounded people to safety and provide them with medical care. This was done, and several young people were evacuated rather quickly. In particular, the young people who were not hurt were quickly evacuated.

Lyngen municipality reports that they were able to test their systems, the next of kin centre was established and the municipality was able to confirm that their own resources functioned.

Joint for FTX: Suggestions for improvements

- Local response crews have little experience and training with major incidents. This constitutes a challenge that should be discussed at a national level.
- Follow up the Barents Joint Manual in "training".
- Handling of major and complex incidents and interaction with other international resources could be further strengthened.
- There has been a proposal for a day for operative crews where they can review equipment and tools that will be in direct connection with the exercise. This could be a type of Training Day for the exercise. It could also be expedient to organise a presentation of how the rescue service works and is developed in the country where the exercise is taking place.
- There is a need to clarify whether foreign rescue officers can take command over Norwegian municipal fire fighters in a situation on Norwegian territory. Further investigation into this is recommended. The outcome of this must be communicated to the respective supervisors prior to the next exercise.
- Coordination of (radio) communication between the different countries rescue resources.

5.5 Media play

The objective of the media and audience play was to help test the participants' ability for risk and crisis communication and to identify room for improvement in the players' information preparedness. The media and audience play practised information and communication handling between affected players, between levels and across sectors and out to the population and media (via public channels, social media, etc.).

The objectives were:

- Enhance awareness and use of media being an important part in the crisis management process for channelling information to the public


The media and audience play practiced information and communication handling between affected players and between levels and across sectors and out to the population and media. Including:

1. Practising the players' ability for risk communication in the preparatory phase up to the rockslide (yellow/orange phase)
2. Practising the players' ability for crisis management
3. Practising the players' ability to handle social media
4. Information handling between local, regional and state levels and across sectors
5. Information handling between the participating countries

Description


Several of the participants held press conferences during the exercise.

An exercise web was established to publish news from the exercise (scenarios), and to simulate social media.



Norsk rikskringkasting (NRK) (Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation) carried out a separate exercise under the direction of NRK Troms. NRK covered the incidents with a TV team, a radio reporter and an online news service journalist.

There were about 20 journalists out in the field during the exercise. They were distributed at the incident site, at the reception centres and in Tromsø, where they exerted pressure on regional authorities. An active audience play was established on social media. A fake “Facebook”-site was established, called “Xbook” and a closed group was established on Twitter for the exercise, where the players could publish messages.



Analysis

The primary purpose of the media and audience play was to test participants' ability for risk and crisis communication.

The participants of the exercise handled the press well. They answered questions and responded to phone calls and demands for interviews. But as we often see in real crisis and in exercises, there is room for improvement when it comes to coordination. Giving a coordinated message is important to prevent contradictory messages.

The use of social media gave greater realism both to the response of the public and the ability for the participants to handle crisis communication. But the use of social media is also creating more challenges. For example, social media makes it clear for the audience when authorities operate with conflicting or contradictory messages. Another experience made was that, in many cases, the authorities did not consider it their responsibility to respond to the audience in social media.

Through monitoring social media the authorities will have an opportunity to discover the public's need for information and they will be able to correct misinformation and contradicting messages. It is also important that the authorities establish communication on social media in an early phase of the crisis to establish themselves as an important channel for information. This is also important to prevent other actors to take this position in areas where the authorities have the responsibility for communication. A further description and discussion is given in chapter 10: Crises communication.

Suggestions for improvements

- Systems for monitoring media and social media are important.
- Social media is suitable for reaching journalists, and can be used more actively for this purpose.
- Social media can also be used to correct mistakes, and to communicate to the public directly.
- It is important to establish communication through social media both to the public and the press in an early phase of a crisis.



Photo: DSB

6. Host Nation Support (HNS)

Description

Host Nation Support was originally a military term, but the concept is today increasingly being used by international organisations that work with disaster management. The international federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the UN and EU are among the organisations that have developed guidelines for receiving assistance in the form of personnel or equipment in an emergency situation. In the civil context, Host Nation Support means the kind of support system a stricken country must have in place in order to efficiently receive and deploy international assistance. Norway has developed a guideline for Host Nation Support in Norway, which, together with the “Barents Joint Manual”, was used as a basis for planning HNS in the exercise. The “Exercise Planning Instructions” (EXPI) and “Safety directive for Barents Rescue 2013” were governing documents in the final part of the plan phase.

The key goal of Host Nation Support is to avoid unnecessary delay and complications when receiving international assistance. During Barents Rescue Norway received police forces, search and rescue teams, fire fighting teams and medical teams from Finland, Sweden and Russia. There is a range of legal, financial and administrative regulations and requirements that must be complied with in order to receive incoming personnel and equipment of this magnitude. Three primary functions of the HNS syndicate during the exercise were therefore to ensure efficient border crossing, establish a functional Reception and Departure Centre (RDC), and provide an HNS liaison as a contact point between incoming rescue forces and national authorities. In order for Host Nation Support to work in a real incident, it is important that it is well known across sectors how one can request international assistance and how the support system can be organised in cooperation with relevant actors. This is the intention behind the national guideline for Host Nation Support. The experiences made during the exercise will contribute to further develop the guideline.

Analysis

The Barents Joint Manual emphasises the importance of efficient border crossing. Despite the fact that both the police and Norwegian Customs and Excise in the Northern Norway region were informed in advance, not all of the public civil servants in the border areas were familiar with the exercise and incoming teams. The HNS liaison attempted to arrive at the border stations before the crews arrived, in order to brief the civil servants on site. At Storskog border station, the Russians travelled together in a convoy and brought two interpreters. The Norwegian police officers at Storskog also spoke Russian and there were no major language difficulties. However, the need for an interpreter for border crossings should always be considered in advance. Handling incoming rescue personnel in addition to normal traffic must also be planned for. In this case, traffic was slow when the convoy arrived, but the HNS liaison encouraged the border station to let the incoming rescue forces bypass the queue in a separate, cordoned off lane. The Russians were escorted by the police and the Norwegian Civil Defence to Base Camp in Lyngen from the border station at Storskog. This was handled by the three affected police districts and the Øst-Finnmark civil defence district. Much due to the

HNS liaison's thorough preparation, the border crossings generally took place in line with HNS, efficiently, and without major issues. Transport to Lyngen also took place soundly in cooperation with the escort service from the police and Norwegian Civil Defence.

To prevent unnecessary obstacles in border crossings, it is important that the HNS liaison is familiar with the regulations that apply for incoming assistance in a given crisis situation. The Barents Joint Manual stipulates that assisting countries must submit complete lists of incoming personnel and resources to the host country to ease border crossings. Furthermore, there are exemptions and special rules for entry of personnel and resources in crisis situations. It should not be taken for granted that such exemption rules are known at the customs station in question in the event of an armed incident. It is therefore important that the HNS liaison is very familiar with the different sectors' areas of responsibility, preparedness plans and has a broad network which can be contacted in the event of problems. Using trained EU experts for this task is therefore recommended.

During the exercise, the reception area the Norwegian Civil Defence established in Base Camp was used as a simplified Reception and Departure Centre. The tasks were still solved in a sound manner, but a better clarification in relation to the tasks related to RDC is needed.

During exercise BR13, the HNS syndicate received lists of equipment and crews, but they were submitted shortly before the exercise, and changes were made continuously until the exercise had started. This made it difficult to ensure effective implementation of key HNS tasks (cf. Item 3.5.1 in the Barents Joint Manual).

The contact between the incident commander and HNS liaison should be such that there is no ambiguity regarding where the response forces should be sent when they have crossed the border. The HNS liaison experienced that the police did not have sufficient expertise to handle the size of the response forces that came during the exercise.

Suggestions for improvements

- The HNS liaison
 - is very important for a well-functioning HNS. The function should therefore consist of several people if necessary, for example one HNS liaison and one administrative support function, or two HNS liaisons with administrative support if necessary.
 - The HNS liaison should be called out at the same time advance notice is given.
 - The HNS liaison should be used when receiving large units at the border.
- The understanding of what it entails to receive foreign crews should be developed on the Norwegian side. This applies both to exercise management and at the local level. Three main phases can be identified for HNS.
 - 1. Requesting international assistance
 - In this phase, better communication between HNS, the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (HRS), police and Norwegian Civil Defence is needed.

- 2. Border crossing
In this phase, it became clear that Norway needs to develop a set of guidelines for border crossings in emergency situations.
- 3. Deployment of international teams in coordinated response efforts
In this phase, uniform response management must be developed in cooperation with the police or other local response management.
- A review of the functional requirements for the RDC should be undertaken. Furthermore, an assessment of whether to apply the OSOCC guidelines could be done. This could potentially be incorporated in the Barents Joint Manual.
- Communication should be part of HNS – it can be assessed whether it is expedient to determine communication standards and requirements for compatible equipment.
- The HNS function should consider the need for interpreting services to support the foreign crews. The Barents Joint Manual can be followed up better in this area.
- The Norwegian Civil Defence's role in HNS should be developed further. The Norwegian Civil Defence contributed with considerable resources, and could have handled RDC if this had been clarified in advance.
- Complete lists of crews and equipment are very important and should be required. The requirements in the Barents Joint Manual must be followed up better.
- The incoming forces' actual capacities must be clarified. The requirements in the Barents Joint Manual must be followed up better.
- The HNS liaison must be aware that networking is an integral part of the role.
- The border authorities in the Barents Region must receive more information on the agreements – Barents Joint Manual and Barents Agreement. One suggestion is organising a workshop.

7. Plans and agreements

Every organisation with preparedness responsibility have at its disposal a set of plans, which describe how crisis management and field operations should be initiated and carried out to handle extraordinary incidents. The planning complex may include general preparedness plans, auxiliary plans, contingency plans, written instructions, etc. In addition, various sector-wide and national preparedness plans as well as international agreements may contribute to setting the framework for mutual, overall coordination and cooperation. The participating organisations have been asked the following questions:

- *Did experiences from Barents Rescue 2013 cause your organisation to consider changes to plans?*
- *If your organisation attended BR2011 - have you done any changes based on the experiences in 2011?*
- *Did the Barents Agreement provide a good framework for coordination and cooperation between nations?*

Description

A number of players report that they have made changes in the plans based on experience from Barents Rescue in 2011. Plans were also updated and developed in advance during the planning process. Furthermore, the exercise in 2013 provides further basis for adjusting, changing and establishing new plans.

The experiences after the exercise will contribute to adjustment of the plans, particularly with regard to how management and communication will take place between partners at local and regional levels, but also nationally. Furthermore, there is a need for mapping and documentation of important preparedness resources.

Analysis

The Barents Agreement provides good framework for practising and exchanging expertise and experience between the nations. Although the Barents Agreement provides a good framework for coordination and cooperation between the various nations, Barents Rescue 13 shows that there might be room for improvements in the procedures relating to the receipt of aid forces, importation of materials, animals, etc. Barents Agreement Article 7 of "*Mutual assistance*" could be operationalised in terms of health service's needs. Agreement should be able to provide specific cooperation measures and procedures in relation to the intent of the agreement.

ROS analyses at regional and national levels are used to identify what assistance each nation needs. Likewise, a national risk picture provides a basis for planning exercises based on the largest challenges, and where the need for neighbour assistance is greatest, using the statutes and regulations each country is governed by.

Much of the improvement of cooperation lies in exchanging experience and training in smaller scopes before the actual exercise, as was done in BR 11. They conducted preparatory courses in procedures for different safety challenges. This resulted in good exchange of experience between different units, cultures and levels of expertise.

The Ministry of Justice highlights the dynamic elements of the Agreement, in particular the Joint Committee for Rescue Cooperation, the Barents Joint Manual and the focus on exercises. These instruments constitute basis for further development of the cooperation.

Barents Rescue 2013 highlighted and identified weaknesses and gaps in the current statutes and regulations for the Norwegian Armed Forces' assistance of the police. This means that we found situations and incidents that are not covered by the current regulations. This is still under discussion and has been announced through official channels in the respective organisations, in addition to DSB. These are important experiences in connection with preparing a new act for the Armed Forces' assistance of the police.

Suggestions for improvements

- Further development of the Joint Committee for Rescue Cooperation and the Barents Joint Manual. This task should be assigned to BEAC and the Justice Ministry.
- The participants are encouraged to evaluate and update their plans prior to the exercise.

8. Crisis management organisation

Every organisation with preparedness responsibility should be able to set up a crisis management unit – e.g. a crisis staff with associated staff support functions. The ability to activate the crisis management unit quickly is essential for maintaining control and establishing a sound foundation for subsequent crisis management and field operations. Furthermore, it may be relevant or required to send liaison officers to other organisations' crisis management units and/or the coordinating joint crisis management forums at local, regional or national level. These forums typically have a permanent set of participants and the ability to incorporate other participants, depending on the incident in question. The participating organisations have been asked the following questions:

- *Was your organisation's internal crisis management unit activated timely, after established procedures, at correct preparedness level, and with appropriate members?*
- *Was your organisation represented in external crisis management forums?*
- *Were roles and responsibilities clear within your organisation?*
- *Were roles and responsibilities clear vis-à-vis other organisations and forums?*
- *Did physical crisis management facilities and technology function well?*
- *Were adequate substitution opportunities, provisioning, security, and information made available to personnel in the crisis management facilities?*

Description

In Norway the rescue work is based on the principles of liability, conformity, decentralisation and cooperation, which means that the participating entities are in their normal location, perform the tasks they would have carried out in an actual incident, and work with the means that are normally available to them. Before the exercise started, all entities were prepared to activate their crisis management organisations.

In most entities, the crisis management organisation was activated at the right time and according to established procedures. The Norwegian Government's Crisis Council was also convened.

Strategic crisis management was only partially tested during Barents Rescue 2013. Defining needs and procuring resources, as well as planning for endurance over time, were therefore only tested to a limited extent.

Analysis

The background for requesting aid via the Barents Agreement will mainly be major incidents that will require crisis management at the strategic level. The aim will be to both procure resources and have the ability to handle an incident of some duration.

Most participants report that the roles were clarified *internally*, but could be ever clearer and need practice. Some also identified a need for improved ownership of roles and responsibilities in the plans, and have gathered experiences and expertise in order to fill the various roles. Very few participants experienced that roles and responsibilities had not been adequately clarified and communicated during the exercise, and these observations applies only to some areas.

Most participants report that roles and responsibilities were clear *vis-à-vis other players*. Some participants reported a need for internal clarification of roles and responsibilities, and some reported a need for clarification with one or more agencies. Individual areas were identified with deficient familiarity with roles and responsibilities.

Several participants describe the benefit of long-term focus as regards the clarification of roles. For others, preparing for the exercise has led to a review of roles and responsibilities between agencies.

The evaluation syndicate has limited basis for evaluating the *foreign players'* familiarity with roles and responsibilities. Sweden report that there is a potential for improved familiarity with other players' roles and responsibilities. This applies both nationally and as regards counterpart authorities in Norway. Improved familiarity with other organisations outside one's own sector and country is presumed to be even more important when the individual country requests resources, and interaction between countries.

Even though each individual organisation has a functioning crisis management organisation and basic familiarity with others, experience and competence as regards *interacting* with others at an operative level, appeared to be challenging. This applies both to interaction with others locally and regionally, as well as interaction with foreign resources.

Few organisations were represented in other organisations' crisis teams, but those that were functioned well. At the operative level, there were good experiences with the use of liaisons. The use of liaisons appears to compensate for limited familiarity with each other's organisations, and also compensates for the lack of standards for communication between organisations/players.

There is a general need for regular reviews of technical crisis management facilities, particularly before major exercises. However, the consequences of certain technical challenges do not appear to have affected crisis management. The exercise did not test equipment and facilities in the event of loss of e.g. electronic communication during such an incident (alternative communication). Encrypted communication was not tested during the exercise.

Suggestions for improvements

- The strategic level is of great significance for all those involved. This is important to remember when planning exercises.
- Improving knowledge about other organisations and their role and mandate, and with organisations outside your own sector and country is recommended
- The system of using liaison officers is probably a good way to make the contact and communication between the organisations better and more effective.
- Look into the strategic crisis management
 - Having a long-term perspective in the planning even during the acute phase of a crisis is recommended. This will create better opportunities for proactive actions. This should be done before planning of the 2015 exercise is complete.

9. Information management

The ability to make the right decisions at the right moments during crises requires, that the involved organisations continuously maintain a comprehensive overview of the situation. At the same time, they must strive to obtain a joint understanding of the situation to coordinate actions and decisions. For this purpose, it is necessary to collect, analyse, and distribute large amounts of information about the crisis in all its phases. This may include “situation reports” (SITREPs) from field operations, minutes from staff meetings, intensified media monitoring, and registration of incoming communications by phone, e-mail, fax, etc. The participating organisations have been asked the following questions:

- *Did your organisation obtain the information needed to perform tasks effectively?*
- *Was your organisation able to receive, analyse and distribute information timely?*
- *Did the organisation produce its own situation reports?*
- *Are templates and distribution lists suitable or did Barents Rescue 2013 show needed change?*
- *Did your organisation exchange situation reports with other organisations?*
- *Did the organisation receive a common situation picture from a joint coordinating staff or authority at central level?*

Description

Barents Rescue showed, as so many previous exercises, that there is a significant demand for a shared situational understanding in all phases of the exercise.

There was a great need for information about what had occurred, particularly during the early phase of the exercise. A large number of players have reported that there was limited access to information. During the introductory phase, access to information was difficult, sparse and deficient, and there were unclear lines as regards the flow of information.

During the crisis, most participants requested more continuous reporting, even when very little had happened. There was a need for status updates on the development and which measures had been implemented, in addition to what may be needed in the future.

Insofar as the players received information, they believe they had good routines for handling and disseminating the information. It may appear as though information exchange between players at the same level was somewhat easier than between different levels.

Several teleconferences were conducted during the day to gather information, coordinate and create a common operational picture between the County Governor, the three municipalities and Troms Police District. More emphasis is placed on gathering rather than providing information.

In some cases, communication was established and maintained satisfactorily during the day (the municipalities, police). In other cases it was not; the DSB did not receive reports and had to ask for it to be done. Also, the municipalities reported at the end of the day that information did not emanate from the County Governor on to them.

Management system for emergency preparedness and security (CIM) functioned well as a crisis management tool for most Norwegian players. As regards other situation reporting, however, the templates should be improved and simplified.

Analysis

A lot of participants request more information from the police. The police itself reports that necessary situation reports were submitted, but that they lacked the plans for crisis communication between themselves and the Office of the County Governor. These plans are being prepared and their importance was clearly underscored during Barents Rescue. Information was received and handled well, but there are improvement items that will be addressed internally. Certain templates must be designed more expediently with the opportunity to adapt to the situation. There was dialogue between Troms Police District and the National Police Directorate (POD). Experience showed that a considerable amount of information was requested from the strategic and political levels. This must be reviewed in more detail.

The Ministry of Justice and Public Security writes as follows in its evaluation: "There is still need of a better solution of sharing verified information from the operational level fast enough to the strategic and political level. The use of templates from all of our underlying agencies is still a challenge. It affects our ability to share information quickly and easily with both underlying agencies and political level."

Templates for situation reporting in the rescue service are provided by IMO (International Maritime Organization) and ICAO (International Civil Aeronautical Organization) and are therefore institutionalised and cannot be changed at the national level.

Suggestions for improvements

- Barents Rescue showed, like so many previous exercises, the demand for a common situation picture - in all phases of the exercise
- Need for information about what's happened in the early stages of the crisis
 - limited access to information
 - the scope of information was limited
 - unclear lines with regards to how information should flow
- Better solution of sharing verified information from the operational level fast enough to the strategic and political level. DSB, The Police Directorate (POD) and the Departement of Justice and preparedness have responsibilities here.

10. Crisis communication

Large incidents and catastrophes result in a massive and sudden pressure for information from the media, affected citizens, politicians, partner organisations, and others. The organisation's crisis communication thus becomes a very important task. The crisis communication should be precise, timely, honest, consistent, and coherent, and it should provide recipients with a foundation for deciding appropriate action. Coordinated crisis communication can help ensure relevant information about the incident, the response and recommended precautions is passed on quickly and continuously via the media and the authorities' own communication channels. The participating organisations have been asked the following questions:

- *Was your organisation able to handle the pressure for information from the media?*
- *Did the organisation use the media proactively as part of its crisis management?*
- *Did the organisation activate a dedicated crisis communication team or did it in other ways strengthen its capacity and ability to communicate with the public?*
- *Did the organisation coordinate its crisis communication with other organisations?*

Description

All the responding players answered that they handled the media pressure they were exposed to, but that there very varying degrees of pressure. As shown in the chapter on media play, there was extensive media play activity during the exercise, but we were still unsuccessful in creating a fully realistic impression of the media pressure. One of the players replied that they had to call in extra resources and improve the distribution of work tasks, but when this was done they were able to handle the inquiries. There was an extensive observer programme and on day two of the exercise one player experienced a significant challenge when they had a substantial observer program while also having to communicate a message to the population and media. As they write themselves: *"When red [phase of the rockslide forecast] was implemented at the same time as the observer program, this service is overwhelmed by the media pressure that will occur. KriseKOM (Local crises communication organisation) and support from neighbouring counties must be developed"*.

On the question concerning proactive use of media as part of crisis management, only one player replies that they have a clear proactive strategy, which also involves the use of social media. The player does not mention to what extent this strategy was actually used during the exercise. Several of the involved municipalities replied that they used the municipal websites and Facebook pages to communicate with their own population. "We published press releases on websites and Facebook. They were also submitted to the media". At the same time, the municipality sees room for improvement: "Could probably have been better at using the media". Another player writes that they lack information, which made it difficult to use the media proactively. The County Governor of Troms had a very difficult task in communicating the message that the forecast phase changed from yellow to orange, and responds as follows to the question as to whether they handled the media pressure during these phases: *"Our dimensioning showed that we are not adequately robust during the preparatory yellow and*

orange phases. Yes, press conferences were held during the first phases, but were absent during the actual exercise. The reason for this was described earlier” [observer program used these resources].

Since media pressure was relatively modest on some players, many replied that they did not have to call in reinforcements. The County Governor of Troms was the player that experienced the most pressure, and also attempted to reinforce by calling in colleagues from Nordland and Finnmark counties. They themselves write that this was the first time their information department has taken part in an exercise and that they see the need to make changes.

Multiple players worked together to coordinate talking points and shared messages with their counterparts from other countries (Norwegian Public Roads Administration and Swedish Transport Administration). On the other hand, only one player replies that they lacked a considerable amount of information and had to monitor media themselves as a source of information.

Analysis

Viewed from a crisis communication perspective, the goal of crisis management must be that correct communication of a message can help bring the situation under control. The players respond that they handled the media pressure they were exposed to, but that there was limited pressure. The challenge of creating realistic media pressure is shared for all exercises and media pressure during an actual incident will be considerably greater.

The scenario involving a rockslide in Lyngen is inspired by the actual risk of this occurrence. Then the players staff must be dimensioned in order to handle the media pressure that will occur. The County Governor of Troms writes that they were not sufficiently robust during the yellow and orange phases. These are the phases when they can communicate to their populace that a dangerous situation is under development. It is crucial that there are plans for this and that one is aware of how to communicate such a message.

Another important aspect highlighted by the exercise, is that when you communicate risk, you must balance a number of considerations. You should not create excessive fear, while at the same time making the population take the situation seriously. Furthermore, the players must be aware of their responsibility to communicate with the population during the orange and red phases.

The players had access to various social media via the exercise web. Certain players, particularly the municipalities, became very active on social media throughout the exercise, and communicated with their citizens and media. Other players did not seize this opportunity.

None of the players replied that they activated their own crisis communication plan. It is uncertain whether this is due to the marginal media pressure on certain players, or whether many players do not have their own crisis communication plan.

As shown in Chapter 9, it is very challenging to establish a common operational picture, and this may be a contributing cause of why it is perceived to be difficult to coordinate a joint message. Nevertheless, many players write that they contacted others and attempted to gather as comprehensive a picture as possible, but that this was time-consuming and was often assigned lower priority; “we spent a long time establishing a comprehensive picture of the situation to be used in the media dialogue, e.g. because many internal players have sub-tasks that must be completed before a comprehensive picture can be established.” “The exercise yielded very useful experience that shows that, in a crisis situation, the communications department must take initiative and ensure that there is a updated picture of the situation at all times that can be used in communication with the media, on websites, etc.”

The exercise also showed that the major players with separate communications departments are obviously better equipped to handle such pressure, but that the players in small organisations were creative and took initiative to handle the media pressure with the resources at their disposal.

Suggestions for improvements

- Crisis communication is a separate discipline where expertise is needed, and it is an advantage to have dedicated professionals for this.
- Crisis communication plans are essential and should be reviewed before an exercise. The plan should also include the use of resources and a plan for calling in reinforcements.
- The players should be more proactive when it comes to information to the public.

11. Coordination of actions and resources

During a crisis there will always be a need for coordination both within organisations and with partners to ensure, that ongoing and planned actions and resource allocations support each other. The results of the coordination should be that acute resource shortages are solved, that individual resources are used where they will matter most, and that unacceptable vulnerabilities are not created by emptying entire areas of resources. Furthermore, effective coordination will provide better conditions for assessing, when resources may be recalled without weakening the collective crisis management effort and emergency response operations in the field. The participating organisations have been asked the following questions:

- *Was the coordination of actions and resources within the organisation effective?*
- *Was the organisation's external coordination of actions and resources effective?*
- *Were comprehensive/joint situation pictures used as part of the coordination?*
- *Was there sufficient focus on potential future developments, and did this incorporate both expected outcomes (prognosis) and "realistic worst case" scenarios?*

Description and Analysis

The local authorities were satisfied with the coordination of actions and resources both internally and externally. The municipalities were also of the opinion that there was adequate focus on the incident's development potential. The municipalities cooperated well and, in this connection, used comprehensive/shared situational understanding in their coordination and the municipality continuously acted on the basis of the worst-case scenario as defined in the emergency preparedness plan.

The Office of the County Governor of Troms is responsible for coordinating, maintaining an overview of, and inform about public safety and emergency preparedness in the county. The County Governor reports to the central authorities and shall function as an interface between the State and municipalities in this area. Through the coordination instructions, the Office shall take responsibility for coordinating efforts in the event of a rockslide in Nordnes. The County Governor must have procedures and expertise to handle issues within e.g. public safety, agriculture, environmental protection, schools and kindergartens, the health and social services sector, development, land planning and municipal finances. The following is quoted from the County Governor's regional emergency preparedness plan: *"In the event of an elevated risk level and a rockslide incident, the County Governor is assigned important tasks as the regional coordination authority. The County Governor shall therefore establish close contact with all affected players. Procedures for situation reporting from municipalities and regional agencies must be activated at the transition into the yellow advisory level. The same applies for regular meetings in the County Emergency Council."*

The County Governor of Troms believes that the internal coordination was effective. Starting in October 2012, the County Governor of Troms' Emergency Preparedness Department organised a separate exercise that acted out the prelude to the rockslide scenario included in BR13. "Exercise Nordnes" was a collaboration with Nord-Norsk fjellovervåking (inter-municipal enterprise in Troms for mountain monitoring - transl. note), the affected municipalities of Lyngen, Kåfjord and Storfjord, and the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE). This exercise was under way when BR13 started. At this time, the County Governor was in the "orange phase" and chose to continue exercising this phase until about 13.30 hours on the first exercise day. This created a number of challenges in relation to other players in BR13 – primarily the police and municipalities - which entered the "red phase" when the exercise started.

Internal coordination of actions and resources in the Police Directorate functioned satisfactorily, but the external coordination was not quite as effective. In particular, inconsistencies were reported as regards the Norwegian Armed Forces' assignment and area of authority. There was insufficient focus on the incidents' development potential in general, and little focus in resource priorities linked to evacuation "deadlines" according to the plans. In the same vein, there was little focus on factors that could complicate the situation for the population and rescue personnel.

The Norwegian Public Roads Administration's Northern Region experienced that their operations organisation, as a whole, handled the incident in line with their procedures. This exercise did not require central coordination on behalf of the Directorate of Public Roads. Neither was there a request from the region to coordinate actions and resources.

As regards the Troms Civil Defence District, internal coordination of actions and resources functioned very well, in spite of certain challenges that arose along the way, which were resolved. External coordination with the police was very successful. The police had its own team in the Civil Defence star tent, and this promoted communication and coordination during the exercise.

Internal coordination of actions and resources in the Norwegian Food Safety Authority could have been more efficient if the regional office had been more deeply involved from the start of the exercise. The external coordination, however, functioned well. The Norwegian Food Safety Authority was mostly self-supplied as regards resources, but got some assistance from the Home Guard (HV). The worst-case scenario remained in focus throughout the exercise. One example of this is that no animals had been evacuated beforehand.

The Norwegian Directorate of Health handled internal coordination according to the crisis plan. The Crisis Committee conducted meetings pursuant to the meeting template. The meetings were held within an acceptable timeframe and without unnecessary paperwork. The Crisis Committee's decisions were clearly communicated and recorded in the minutes. The

transfer of content and decisions from Crisis Committee Meetings to Staff Meetings functioned well. External coordination was tested and generally functioned well, but was somewhat limited as a result of the scope of the exercise. Comprehensive/shared situational understandings were used through Management system for emergency preparedness and security (CIM) for the health sector.

Both the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (OED) and the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs (FKD) reported that the internal coordination of actions and resources was effective both internally and externally. OED points out that the uncertainty of prognoses is difficult to communicate, particularly when the incident involves search and rescue. This is expected to be challenging in real situations.

The Norwegian Coast Guard, represented by KV Andenes, served as Air Coordinator during the exercise. The internal coordination functioned effectively, but external coordination was poor, due to lack of communication between the local police incident commander and the Coast Guard. The challenges could have been resolved if the Coast Guard vessels had access to police radio, thus allowing the ACO and local incident commander to communicate on a carrier the police is already accustomed to, or a police "liaison" could potentially have been on board KV Andenes to assist in communication vis-à-vis the local incident commander. KV Andenes used comprehensive/shared situational understanding vis-à-vis the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre for Northern Norway (JRCC-NN), and maintain continuous focus on the incident's development potential.

The Joint Rescue Coordination Centre for Northern Norway (JRCC-NN): The external coordination of actions and resources functioned somewhat. There was deficient flow of information from Rescue Sub Center and unclear organisation and communication with ACO, which resulted in sub-optimal resource priorities. Comprehensive/shared situational understanding was not used in connection with external resources and organisations, but all activities and both minor and major rescue operations are constructed around sharing the same internal situational understanding. Strategic management had a proactive mind-set and had alternatives ready in case the situation changed.

As regards local Rescue Sub Center, as an agency to be used by the chief of police to carry out long-term strategic decisions concerning incidents that have occurred, there was insufficient focus on the incident's potential development during the exercise. For example, there is potential for improvement as regards plans for handling the crisis after the rockslide has occurred.

Suggestions for improvements

- County Governor of Troms believed that internal coordination worked effectively. There is a need for regional coordination of the efforts in the local communities.

- The Police Directorate, coordination of actions and resources were satisfactory, external coordination did not work quite as effective. It was specifically reported ambiguities concerning use of Military Forces mission and jurisdiction.

12. Final comments

Findings from observations and the participants' own evaluations show that there is a need for training to be better prepared. The need for training is even stronger when the players have to interact with foreign resources. There is certainly a potential for better coordination between both local, regional and national agencies and organisations.

The need to further develop the Host Nation Support function in all phases of an operation is important. As a part of this, there is also a need for better knowledge of the other Barents countries' recourses and operational procedures. It seems that Norway could have made better use of the Barents Agreement and Barents Joint Manual. Many of the same lessons learned here also applied during Barents Rescue 2011, which took place in Sweden.

The exercise showed that many resources are available, and involvement and efforts are strong, but it can be immediately concluded that there are still major challenges within the exchange of information and coordination. There is still a ways to go here as regards horizontal and vertical communication at strategic, operative and tactical levels.

The Barents Rescue exercises are intended to strengthen the rescue capabilities of countries in the Barents Region, a region characterized by long distances and relatively limited rescue resources. In acknowledgment of this fact, an agreement was signed between Finland, Russia, Sweden and Norway in December 2008, concerning cooperation around the prevention of, preparedness for, and response to emergencies in the Barents Region.

The agreement stipulates that the countries in the Barents Region within the Barents Euro Arctic Council (BEAC) will observe the benefits of sharing information and lessons learned in relation to preventing and responding to emergencies and preventing or limiting their consequences, including the implementation of training and joint exercises.

An exercise in itself normally has limited value. But the *process* of exercising is of great importance to the many areas of society where knowledge of procedures and the ability to react to situations or crises are vital.

ANNEX: Abbreviations

Abbr	Abbr NO	Description
AAR		After Action Review
ACO		Aircraft Coordinator
ALARMEX		Alarm Exercise
ARG	ARG	Alpine Rescue Team
AT		Assessment Team
BCP		Border Crossing Point
BEAC		Barents Euro Arctic Council
Bo O		Base of Operations
BWA		Bad Weather Alternative
CAB		County Administrative Board
CBRN		Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CCC		Crisis Co-ordination Committee
CCCG		Crisis Communication Coordination Group
CCS		Casualty Collection Centre
CDC		Concept Development Conference
CEP		Civil Emergency Planning
CG		Coast Guard
CIM		Management system for emergency preparedness
CIP		Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIS		Communication and Information System
COP		Chief of Operations
CPG		Core Planning Group
CPX		Command Post Exercise
DSEC		Detailed Scenario Episodes Catalogue
DISTAFF		Directing Staff
EADRCC		Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre
EAPC		Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EMCC	AMK	Emergency Medical Communication Center
EMERCOM		Ministry of Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters
EMPT		Exercise Management Planning Team
EPG		Exercise Planning Guide
EPT		Exercise Planning Team
ERC		Emergency Response Centre
ETD		Estimated time of Departure
EU		European Union
EU-CCA		European Union Crisis Co-ordination Arrangement
EU-ICMA		European Union Integrated Crisis Management Arrangements
EXDIR		Exercise director
EXPI		Exercise Planning Instruction
EXSPEC		Exercise specification
FEG		Field Exercise Group
FER		Final Evaluation Report

Abbr	Abbr NO	Description
FIR		First Impression Report
FPC		Final Planning Conference
FTX		Field Training Exercise
GO		Governmental Organizations
HAT		Head of Assessor Team
HDS		Head of Directing Staff
HG	HV	Home Guard (military)
HNS		Host Nation Support
HQ		Headquarters
IAEA		International Atomic Energy Agency
INSARAG		International Search and Rescue Advisory Group
IO		International Organizations
IPC		Initial Planning Conference
JOPG		Joint Operational Planning Group
JRCC	HRS	Joint Rescue Coordination Center
LEL		Local Exercise Leader
LEMA	LRS	Local Emergency Management Authority
LO		Liaison Officer
MCS		Mass Casualty Situation
MEDEVAC		Medical Evacuation
MIC		Monitoring Information Centre (EU)
MPC		Main Planning Conference
NACC		The North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NCA		Norwegian Coastal Administration
NGO		Non Governmental Organizations
NJHQ	FOH	Norwegian Joint Headquarters
NOCGV	KV	Norwegian Coast Guard Vessel
OCE		Officer Conducting the Exercise
OSC		On-Site Commander (coordinator)
OSDS		On-Site Directing Staff (DISTAFF)
OSE		Officer Scheduling the Exercise
OSOCC		On-Site Operations Coordination Centre
PIC		Public Information Centre/ Press and information center
POC		Point of Contact
POE		Point of Entry
PWG		Project Working Group
PXD		Post Exercise Discussions
RC		Rescue Commander
RDC		Reception and Departure Center (HNS-function)
R-EMCC	R-AMK	Regional Emergency Medical Communication
RMA	RFH	Regional Medical Administration
RS	RS	Norwegian Sea Rescue
RSC	LRS	Rescue Sub Center
SAR		Search and Rescue
SITCEN		(European Union) Situation Centre

Abbr	Abbr NO	Description
SNAM		Swedish National Air Medevac
SOP		Standard Operating Procedures
SSAR		Specialized Search and Rescue
TC		Team Commander
TTX		Table-Top Exercise
UNDAC		United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team
UN-OCHA		United Nations Officer for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNN	UNN	University Hospital North-Norway - Tromsø
USAR		Urban Search and Rescue
UTC		Universal Time Coordinated
VOB		Visitors and Observers Bureau
VTC		Video Television Conference
VTS	VTC	Vessel Traffic Service
WG		Working group
WHO		World Health Organization
XHNS		Exercise Host Nation Support

ANNEX: SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS in BARENTS RESCUE 2013

Planning process

- The idea of Barents exercises should be supporting the Barents Region as a whole. The exercises should be based on risk assessments. A joint improvement plan should be established and then determine the added value the exercise could bring and how.
- The form and content of the conferences should be clarified, and to what extent the syndicates will be working independently during the planning conferences.
- Guidelines should be established for preparing exercise goals – ensuring a more unified understanding of what an exercise goal entails. There should also be deadlines for when the exercise goals must be defined.
- Need for presentation of the host nations government's organisation of rescue operations.
- More awareness about why and what we practice – focus on evaluation and experiences from former exercises.
- Many had little experience with the execution of exercises - the need for courses. Written material that easily explains the background for the agreement and exercise.
- Better systematic use of lessons identified from former Barents Rescue Exercises in the planning process.
- BR13 focused mainly on the field training. It is important to decide upon to what extent the Barents Rescue Exercises also should emphasise exercise of the strategic levels.

AlarmEx

- Notification procedures in the Barents Joint Manual should also include telephone and e-mail.
- It is recommended that “notification of emergencies” should also be accompanied by telephone contact.
- Conducting a “small-scale” Alarm Exercise each year under the supervision of the Joint Committee, combined with a yearly revision of the Barents Joint Manual (see also section 4.2.2) could be recommended.

Field Training Exercise

DISTAFF:

- An important part of the planning process is to produce scenario injects for the DSEC. Based on expertise, participants from organizations and agencies in all countries were invited to contribute, but the contributions could be followed up to a greater extent.
- The use of international working standards such as OSOCC, INSARAG guidelines could be used in the Barents exercises in the future.
- A joint improvement plan should be established and then determine what added value the exercise could bring and how.

Joint for FTX: Evacuation, Tunnel accidents, Youth camp

- Local response crews have little experience and training with major incidents. This constitutes a challenge that should be discussed at a national level.
- Follow up the Barents Joint Manual in “training”.
- Handling of major and complex incidents and interaction with other international resources could be further strengthened.
- There has been a proposal for a day for operative crews where they can review equipment and tools that will be in direct connection with the exercise. This could be called a type of Training Day for the exercise. In this connection, it could also be expedient to organise a presentation of how the rescue service works and is developed in the country where the exercise is taking place.
- There is a need to clarify whether foreign rescue officers can take command over Norwegian municipal firefighters in a situation on Norwegian territory. Further investigation into this is recommended. The outcome of this must be communicated to the respective supervisors prior to the next exercise.
- Coordination of (radio) communication between the different countries rescue resources.

Media play

- Systems for monitoring media and social media are important.
- Social media is suitable for reaching journalists, and can be used more actively for this purpose.
- Social media can also be used to correct mistakes, and to communicate to the public directly.
- It is important to establish communication through social media both to the public and the press in an early phase of a crisis.

Host Nation Support (HNS)

- The HNS liaison
 - is very important for a well-functioning HNS. The function should therefore consist of several people if necessary, for example one HNS liaison and one administrative support function, or two HNS liaisons with administrative support if necessary.
 - The HNS liaison should be called out at the same time advance notice is given.
 - The HNS liaison should be used when receiving large units at the border.
- The understanding of what it entails to receive foreign crews should be developed on the Norwegian side. This applies both to exercise management and at the local level. Three main phases can be identified for HNS.
 - 1. Requesting international assistance
In this phase, better communication between HNS, the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (HRS), police and Norwegian Civil Defence is needed.
 - 2. Border crossing
In this phase, it became clear that Norway needs to develop a set of guidelines for border crossings in emergency situations.
 - 3. Deployment of international teams in coordinated response efforts
In this phase, uniform response management must be developed in cooperation with the police or other local response management.
- A review of the functional requirements for the RDC should be undertaken. Furthermore, an assessment of whether to apply the OSOCC guidelines could be done. This could potentially be incorporated in the Barents Joint Manual.
- Communication should be part of HNS – it can be assessed whether it is expedient to determine communication standards and requirements for compatible equipment.
- The HNS function should consider the need for interpreting services to support the foreign crews. The Barents Joint Manual can be followed up better in this area.
- The Norwegian Civil Defence's role in HNS should be developed further. The Norwegian Civil Defence contributed with considerable resources, and could have handled RDC if this had been clarified in advance.
- Complete lists of crews and equipment are very important and should be required. The requirements in the Barents Joint Manual must be followed up better.
- The incoming forces' actual capacities must be clarified. The requirements in the Barents Joint Manual must be followed up better.
- The HNS liaison must be aware that networking is an integral part of the role.
- The border authorities in the Barents Region must receive more information on the agreements – Barents Joint Manual and Barents Agreement. One suggestion is organising a workshop.

Plans and agreements

- Further development of the Joint Committee for Rescue Cooperation and the Barents Joint Manual. This task should be assigned to BEAC and the Justice Ministry.
- The participants are encouraged to evaluate and update their plans prior to the exercise.

Crisis management organisation

- The strategic level is of great significance for all those involved. This is important to remember when planning exercises.
- Improving knowledge about other organisations and their role and mandate, and with organisations outside your own sector and country is recommended
- The system of using liaison officers is probably a good way to make the contact and communication between the organisations better and more effective.
- Look into the strategic crisis management
Having a long-term perspective in the planning even during the acute phase of a crisis is recommended. This will create better opportunities for proactive actions. This should be done before planning of the 2015 exercise is complete.

Information management



- Barents Rescue showed, like so many previous exercises, the demand for a common situation picture - in all phases of the exercise
- Better solution of sharing verified information from the operational level fast enough to the strategic and political level. DSB, POD and JD have responsibilities here.
- Need for information about what's happened in the early stages of the crisis
 - limited access to information
 - the scope of information was limited
 - unclear lines with regards to how information should flow

Crisis communication

- Crisis communication is a separate discipline where expertise is needed, and it is an advantage to have dedicated professionals for this.
- Crisis communication plans are essential and should be reviewed before an exercise. The plan should also include the use of resources and a plan for calling in reinforcements.
- The players should be more proactive when it comes to information to the public.

Coordination of actions and resources

- County Governor of Troms believed that internal coordination worked effectively. There is a need for regional coordination of the efforts in the local communities.
- The Police Directorate, coordination of actions and resources were satisfactory, external coordination did not work quite as effective. It was specifically reported ambiguities concerning use of Military Forces mission and jurisdiction.



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